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LABOR LAW-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-JOINT VIOLATION BY
EMPLOYER AND. LABOR UNION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964-SETTLING EMPLOYEES' CLAIM IN FULL ENTITLES
EMPLOYER TO CONTRIBUTION FROM LABOR UNION.
Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co. (3d Cir. 1980)
In the years between 1964 and 1971, workers at a warehouse oper-
ated by the G.C. Murphy Company (Murphy) were covered by collective
bargaining agreements under which women were paid less than men
performing the same work.' Nineteen named plaintiffs filed a class
action on behalf of Murphy's female employees,2 alleging violations of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).3 Murphy was
named as a defendant, along with the International Union of Wholesale
and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO (the International) and the
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 940 (Local 940),
the unions which represented the women at the warehouse. 4
* Editor's Note: As a matter of policy, the Villanova Law Review generally
treats decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
a single annual Third Circuit Review issue. This Note is being published
separately in view of the fact that the United States Supreme Court currently
has sub judice the related case of Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 969 (D.D.C. July 7, 1977), aff'd in
part and remanded in part, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100
S. Ct. 3008 (1980). For a discussion of Northwest Airlines, see notes 57-65
and accompanying text infra.
1. Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248, 250 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 351 (1980).
2. Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 329 F. Supp. 563, 565 (W.D. Pa. 1971). The
complaint alleged that the collective bargaining agreements provided for sepa-
rate job classifications, pay scales, and seniority systems for male and female
employees at Murphy's McKeesport, Pennsylvania warehouse. 629 F.2d at
250. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the labor unions which had repre-
sented them during negotiation of the agreements had violated the duty of
fair representation, imposed by the National Labor Relations Act and the
Labor-Management Relations Act, by acquiescing in and abiding by the al-
legedly discriminatory provisions of the agreements. See Glus v. G.C. Murphy
Co., 562 F.2d 880, 882 (3d Cir. 1977) (prior opinion on jurisdictional issue).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (1976). For discussion of the provisions of
Title VII, see notes 50-56 and accompanying text infra. The plaintiffs also
alleged violations of the federal Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). 629
F.2d at 250. The Equal Pay Act prohibits wage differentials on the basis of
sex for work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, performed under
similar working conditions, unless the differentials arise out of a merit or
seniority system based upon any factor other than sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)
(1976). The Equal Pay Act also provides that it is unlawful for a labor
organization to cause or attempt to cause an employer to violate the Act. Id.
§ 206(d)(2) (1976).
4. 629 F.2d at 250. A second class action was brought in the Western
District of Pennsylvania against Murphy and the General Teamsters, Chauf-
(223)
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Murphy filed a cross-claim against the International, Local 940, 5
and a third union, the General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers,
Local Union No. 249 (Local 249), the successor collective bargaining
agent to Local 940 for the female employees at the warehouse, 6 con-
tending that the unions were solely responsible for the allegedly dis-
criminatory provisions in the collective bargaining agreements, and
demanding judgment against the unions for any recovery awarded the
plaintiffs against Murphy.7 Prior to trial, Murphy reached a settlement
with the plaintiff class 8 and also settled its cross-claim against Local 940.9
Murphy then prosecuted its cross-claim against the International and
Local 249.10
The district court found that Murphy and the unions were equally
at fault 11 and thus equally liable for the employees' financial losses
arising from the discrimination. 12 Accordingly, the district court held
feurs, and Helpers, Local Union No. 249, which replaced Local 940 as the
collective bargaining agent for the female employees at the warehouse on
January 30, 1971. See Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889, 891 (3d
Cir. 1977). The claim by the employees against Local 249 was based upon
its failure to rectify retroactively the disparity in wages between male and
female employees and its refusal to accept Murphy's offer of retroactive parity.
Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880, 883 n.1 (3d Cir. 1977) (prior opinion
on jurisdictional issue).
5. 629 F.2d at 250.
6. Id. The two class actions were joined by the district court for de-
termination of Murphy's cross-claim. Id. at 250-51.
7. Id. at 250. Murphy based its cross-claim on the grounds that the
allegedly discriminatory provisions had been incorporated into the collective
bargaining agreements at the insistence of the unions and were accepted in
good faith by Murphy. Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880, 883 (3d Cir.
1977) (prior opinion on jurisdictional issue).
8. 629 F.2d at 250. The settlement was for $648,000. Of that amount,
$448,000 was allocated to the employees' Title VII claim, $100,000 to their
Equal Pay Act claim, and the remaining $100,000 was to pay the employees'
attorneys fees. Id.
9. Id. The settlement was for $4,146, an amount which represented Local
940's total treasury. Id.
10. Id. at 250-51.
11. Id. at 251. The district court based its finding of equal liability upon
the fact that Murphy and the International had jointly participated in the
negotiations which produced the collective bargaining agreements. Glus v.
G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880, 883-84 (3d Cir. 1977) (prior opinion on juris-
dictional issue). Local 940 was found to share in the International's liability
since the International's representative at the negotiations represented Local
940's interests as well as those of the International. Id. Further, the agree-
ments had been signed by representatives of Murphy, the International, and
Local 940. Id. at 883 n.2.
Similarly, Local 249 was held to be equally liable with Murphy for the
discriminatory effects of the collective bargaining agreement executed after
Local 249 took over as the employees' agent because both Murphy and Local
249 jointly failed to promptly provide for retroactive parity in wages and
employment opportunities among male and female employees. Denicola v.
G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889, 891-92 (3d Cir. 1977).
12. 629 F.2d at 251. See 29 U.S.C. §216(b)-216(c). See also Denicola v.
G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889, 892 (3d Cir. 1977) (equal liability of Local
[VOL. 26: p. 223
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
that Murphy was entitled to contribution from the unions 's and calcu-
lated the judgment in favor of Murphy. 14 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit 15 affirmed, holding that a defendant who
settles for the full amount of damages of a Title VII complaint has a
right of contribution from a non-settling co-defendant who is jointly
liable. Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 351 (1980).
Contribution is generally understood to involve the payment, by
each of several joint tortfeasors, of a proportionate share of the plaintiff's
damages to another tortfeasor who has paid more than his proportionate
share.' 6 Each tortfeasor's proportionate share may be determined ac-
249 and Murphy for agreements executed after Local 249 took over as em-
ployees' collective bargaining agent); Hodgson v. Baltimore Regional Joint
Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 462 F.2d 181,
182 (4th Cir. 1972) (union held liable for illegally withholding wages).
13. 629 F.2d at 251.
14. Id. See note 8 supra. In accordance with its findings that Murphy
and the unions were equally responsible for the employees' financial losses,
the district court held the International and Local 249 liable together for one-
half of the $448,000 settlement of the Title VII claim. Id. at 251, 257. The
liabilities of the unions were prorated according to the respective durations of
each's representation of the female employees at the warehouse. Glus v. G.C.
Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880, 884 (3d Cir. 1977) (Glus I) (prior opinion on juris-
dictional issue).
In Glus I, the Third Circuit remanded to the district court for a deter-
mination of whether the employees' failure to name the International as a
defendant in their original claim before the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction when the
employees filed suit in the district court. Id. at 888. See note 83 infra.
Since Local 940 and the International had acted jointly throughout their
part in the negotiations and Local 940's $4,146 settlement with Murphy ex-
hausted its financial resources, the district court also held the International
liable for Local 940's share of the award of contribution. 629 F.2d at 258.
However, the International's liability was credited in the amount of the settle-
ment made by Local 940 with Murphy. 562 F.2d at 884.
Murphy was denied contribution as to the $100,000 of the settlement
allocated to the Equal Pay Act claim. Id. The district court based its deter-
mination upon its observation that the Equal Pay Act does not purport to
allow employees a cause of action against a labor union, but only against an
employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976). This conclusion was subsequently
affirmed by the Third Circuit. Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d at
894-95 (3d Cir. 1977).
The district court also apportioned the $100,000 attorneys' fees between
the Title VII recovery and the Equal Pay Act recovery. 562 F.2d at 884. just
as Murphy was denied contribution as to the Equal Pay Act recovery itself,
Murphy was similarly disallowed contribution as to the attorneys' fees allocated
thereto. Id. Of the attorneys' fees allocated to the Title VII claim, one-half
was charged against the International and Local 249 on the same basis as was
the Title VII recovery itself. Id.
15. The case was heard by Judges Gibbons, Higginbotham, and Sloviter.
Judge Higginbotham wrote the opinion of the court. Judge Sloviter filed a
dissenting opinion.
16. Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEx. L.
REv. 150, 150 (1967).
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cording to his relative fault in causing the plaintiff's injury 17 or may
simply involve dividing the damages by the number of tortfeasors taking
part in causing the injury.' s Further, the share of an absent or insolvent
tortfeasor may be borne by his cohorts if the court so directs.' 9 It is
commonly stated that a common law right of contribution involves two
elements: 1) the contribution defendant must have been in some part
responsible for the plaintiff's injury; and 2) the contribution defendant's
role must be such that he would have been liable in a direct action by
the tort plaintiff.20
Contribution is often confused with indemnity, and the two terms
are often used interchangeably, 2" but there is a distinction between the
two concepts: while contribution involves the payment of proportionate
shares; indemnity, which arises from an express or implied contract, in-
volves a complete shift of the liability to another tortfeasor rather than
partial reimbursement. 22 It has been suggested that indemnity arose in
response to the common law's general prohibition of contribution be-
tween joint tortfeasors. 23
The common law rule in England prohibiting contribution between
joint tortfeasors can be traced to 1799 and the leading case of Merry-
weather v. Nixan,24 which held that no contribution would be allowed
between joint tortfeasors when the tort victim's original recovery had
been for an intentional tort. 25 The Merryweather court stated, how-
17. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 114 N.W.2d 105, 107 (1962).
18. See Early Settlers Ins. Co. v. Schweid, 221 A.2d 920, 923 (D.C. App.
1966).
19. See Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 25 N.J. 17, 38, 134 A.2d
761, 772 (1957).
20. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 20 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 969, 973 (D.D.C. July 7, 1977), aff'd in part and remanded
in part, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. gran'ted, 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980).
See generally, W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 309 (4th ed. 1971). For further dis-
cussion of Northwest Airlines, see notes 57-65 and accompanying text infra.
The requirement of a common liability to the tort plaintiff allows the
contribution defendant a defense to a claim for contribution whenever the
latter has a defense to an action brought by the former. See, e.g., Yellow Cab
Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (family immunity); Shonka
v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 1178, 1182, 152 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1967) (assumption of
risk); Hunsucker v. High Point Bending &c Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 571, 75
S.E.2d 768, 777 (1953) (substitution of Workmens' Compensation for common
law liability); Hill Hardware Corp. v. Hesson, 198 Va. 425, 429-30, 94 S.E.2d
256, 258-59 (1956) (automobile guest statute).
21. See W. PROSSER, supra note 20, at 310.
22. See McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 328, 107
N.E.2d 463, 471 (1952).
23. See Comment, Toward a Workable Rule of Contribution in the Fed-
eral Couits, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 123, 126 (1965). See also notes 24-31 and
accompanying text infra.
24. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799).
25. Id. at 1337. Merryweather and Nixan had jointly converted the
machinery in a mill. Id. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 20, at 305. The
owner of the mill brought an action for trover and procured a judgment
against both Merryweather and Nixan, but levied the whole judgment
(VOL. 26: p. 223
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ever, that its decision would not affect cases involving claims for in-
demnity where the consideration for the promise of indemnity was an
act not in itself unlawful.2 6 Expanding upon this distinction, later
English cases allowed contribution between joint tortfeasors unless the
contribution claimant had acted wilfully and consciously in injuring
the tort victim. 27
In the United States, Merryweather was enthusiastically adopted
during the nineteenth century and contribution was denied in a variety
of cases, 28 but the American courts soon came to disregard the later
against Merryweather. 101 Eng. Rep. at 1337. Merryweather sought reim-
bursement from Nixan for part of the damages, arguing that his full payment
raised an implied assumpsit for contribution from Nixan. Id. Merryweather
was denied recovery. Id. See generally Reath, Contribution Between Persons
Jointly Charged With Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REv.
176 (1898).
26. 101 Eng. Rep. at 1337 (dictum). A case antedating Merryweather
permitted indemnity between joint intentional tortfeasors. See Battersey's Case,
124 Eng. Rep. 41 (1623) (false imprisonment). See also Fletcher v. Harcot,
123 Eng. Rep. 1097 (1623) (action for indemnity by Fletcher against Harcot
following Battersey's full recovery of damages for false imprisonment from
Fletcher in Battersey's Case).
Harcot arrested Battersey and brought him to an inn operated by Fletcher.
See Fletcher v. Harcot, 123 Eng. Rep. at 1097. Harcot asked Fletcher to hold
Battersey overnight as prisoner at the inn and promised to indemnify Fletcher
if the imprisonment proved to be unlawful. Id. Harcot's promise of indemnity
was held to be enforceable since the request to hold Battersey had been made
under color of legal right and the act requested of Fletcher did not appear on
its face to be unlawful. Id. This distinction was explained in Battersey's
Case:
[I]f I request [you] to enter into another mans [sic] ground, and in
my name to drive out the beasts [thereon], and impound them, and
promise to save you harmless, this is a good assumpsit, and yet the
act is tortious . . . [but] if I request you to beat another, and promise
to save you harmless, this assumpsit is not good, for the act appears
in it self [sic] to be unlawful ....
Battersey's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. at 41.
27. See W. PROSSER, supra note 20, at 306. The determinative factor in
denying contribution has been whether the contribution claimant may be pre-
sumed to have known that he was committing an unlawful act. Pearson v.
Skelton, 150 Eng. Rep. 533 (1836). Accordingly, indemnity has been allowed
where the claimant had innocently participated in the commission of an in-
tentional tort. Adamson v. Jarvis, 130 Eng. Rep. 693 (1827) (conversion). See
also note 26 supra.
One English case interpreted the distinction drawn in Merryweather to
mean, not that contribution was completely disallowed, but merely that an
implied promise to indemnify was not raised by the fact that one tortfeasor
had discharged the whole of a joint liability. See The Englishman & the Aus-
tralia, [1895] P. 212, 217. Criticizing this interpretation, one commentator has
suggested that Merryweather states not the general rule but rather the excep-
tion; the general rule being that among persons jointly liable, the law implies
an assumpsit for either indemnity or contribution unless wilful wrongdoing
was involved. See Reath, supra note 25, at 177, 193 n.2.
28. See, e.g., Rhea v. White, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 121 (1859) (joint conver-
sion); Atkins v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 78 (1870) (joint publication of libel); Spalding
v. Oakes' Adm'r, 42 Vt. 343 (1869) (keeping ram known to be vicious). See
generally Reath, supra note 25, at 180-83.
1980-1981]
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English cases' limitation of the doctrine to the wilful and conscious
wrongdoer 29 and eventually began to cite Merryweather as authority for
the broad proposition that there may be no contribution among joint
tortfeasors. 80 More recently, however, the trend has been to allow con-
tribution in a wide range of cases. 81
29. See, e.g., Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 P. 389 (1921)
(concurrent negligence causing auto accident); Royal Indem. Co. v. Becker, 122
Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194 (1930) (concurrent negligence). But see Knell v.
Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (allowing contribution in auto acci-
dent case). The Knell court limited the rule of Merryweather to cases in-
volving intentional rather than wilful and conscious wrongdoing, a limitation
somewhat narrower than that of the English cases after Merryweather. Id.
at 666. See also note 27 and accompanying text supra.
The source of the confusion with the scope of the rule of Merryweather
has been an object of speculation by several commentators. Dean Prosser
suggested that the English view of the rule was generally applied by the Amer-
ican courts until modern procedure allowed joinder of all persons who had
caused the same injury; at which time, "the origin of the rule and the reason
for it were lost to sight." W. PROSSER, supra note 20, at 306. Reath attributes
the confusion to the overly broad statement of the holding in the syllabus of
the Merryweather decision as written by the court reporter. Reath, supra note
25, at 183, quoting J. CLERK & W. LINDSELL, TORTS 56 (2d ed. 1896). Reath
also notes that in 1799 the word "torts" was not generally thought to include
negligence cases, but rather only what are called today the intentional torts.
Reath, supra, at 178.
30. See Washington Gaslight Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534, 552 (1899)
(libel). See also Union Stockyards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 196 U.S. 217
(1905) (concurrent negligence). The Union Stockyards Court based its deci-
3ion to disallow contribution upon distinctions between active and passive
negligence and distinctions between primary and secondary negligence, and
concluded that it did not have before it one of the "exceptional cases" where
contribution or indemnity would be permitted. Id. at 228. The exceptional
cases were those in which a less culpable defendant sought contribution from
a co-defendant who was principally liable for an injury. Id. at 224. As an
example of a case in which contribution or indemnity would be allowed, the
Court suggested a situation where a municipality satisfied a judgment held by
a plaintiff injured by a defect in a sidewalk where the defect was caused by
the negligence or active fault of a property owner. Id.
31. See, e.g., Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106
(1974) (admiralty); Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply,
Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979) (antitrust); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Trans-
port Workers, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 969 (D.D.C. July 7, 1977), aff'd
in part and remanded in part, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted,
100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980) (Title VII); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d
400 (7th Cir. 1974) (midair collision); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Minnesota Trans.
Ry., 371 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1967) (Federal Employers' Liability Act); Grogg
v. General Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (sex discrimination);
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976) (Securities Exchange Act of
1934); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), ceet. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971) (Securities
Act of 1933). But see Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship. Corp., 342 U.S. 282
(1952) (denying contribution in admiralty); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass
Co., [1977-1] TRADE Rjrc. REP. (CCH) 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (denying con-
tribution in antitrust) ; Sabre Ship. Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd.,
298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (denying contribution in antitrust).
Halcyon Lines and Cooper Stevedoring are illustrative of the changing
judicial attitudes towards contribution in the context of similar factual situa-
6
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The common law concept of contribution represented by Merry-
weather and its progeny may be supplanted, however, by an explicit
statutory grant of a right of contribution 32 or by the judicial creation
of such a right through statutory construction.38 The contribution
claimant seeking redress as a matter of federal law need not depend
upon an act of Congress for explicit allowance of a right of contribution
since, despite the pronouncement in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 8 4 that there
is no federal general common law, 5 there has developed a "specialized
federal common law" in areas of national concern. 6 Two of the areas
tions. Both cases involved negligently caused injuries to dockworkers aboard
a ship at port. See Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. at
107; Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship. Corp., 342 U.S. at 283. Further, both were
decided in the context of the general admiralty rule allowing contribution for
damages arising from collisions at sea. See generally The Max Morris, 137
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1890). Halcyon Lines refused to extend the admiralty rule to a
non-collision case, stating: "In the absence of legislation, courts exercising a
common-law jurisdiction have generally held that they cannot on their own
initiative create an enforceable right of contribution as between joint tort-
feasors." 342 U.S. at 285 (footnote omitted). Choosing not to follow the rea-
soning in Halcyon Lines, the Cooper Stevedoring Court distinguished the
earlier case, and read it as standing for a "more limited rule" rather than an
absolute bar against contribution in noncollision cases: "On the facts of this
case, then, no countervailing considerations detract from the well-established
maritime rule allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors." 417 U.S. at
111, 113.
32. Several jurisdictions have enacted statutes authorizing contribution.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6301, 6302(d) (1974) (allocation of liability
according to relative fault; no requirement that all defendants be joined by the
plaintiff); Ky. REv. STAT. § 412.030 (1972) (declaration of a right of contribu-
tion between negligent joint tortfeasors; details left to be filled in by the
courts); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972) (requirement of joinder of all de-
fendants; defendants share equally in payment of damages); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:53A-3 (West 1952) (provision for pro rata allocation of liability; no
requirement of joinder of all defendants). See generally W. PROSSER, supra
note 20, at 307-08 (commenting on the variations among the statutes); Note,
Adjusting Losses Among Joint Tortfeasors in Vehicular Collision Cases, 68
YALE L.J. 964, 981-54app. (1959) (collection and classification of statutory
contribution provisions).
As a matter of federal statutory law, Congress has provided express rights
of contribution in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(f), 78i(e), 78r(b) (1976).
33. See notes 40-46 and accompanying text infra. A failure by Congress
to expressly provide a remedy such as contribution is not inevitably inconsistent
with an intent to make a remedy available under a statute; such an intent
may be found implicitly in the language or structure of the statute or in the
circumstances surrounding its enactment. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979).
34. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35. Id. at 78. The Erie Court wrote: "Except in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case
is the law of the State . . .'. There is no federal general common law." Id.
36. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 385, 405 (1964). Indeed, this development began on the
very day that Erie was handed down. See Hinderlider v. LaPlata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (apportionment between two states
of water from an interstate stream to be determined as a question of federal
common law).
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in which federal common law has developed are: 37 1) the implication
of a private cause of action on behalf of an individual harmed by the
violation of a federal statute; 88 and 2) judicial "filling" of the interstices
of a federal statute.89
When a statute specifies a standard of conduct but does not create a
private cause of action for an individual harmed by a violation of that
statute, a federal court may nevertheless find an implied cause of action
on behalf of the injured individual.40 The process involves an inquiry
into whether the statute's legislative history and intent support judicial
recognition of the remedy.4 ' In Cort v. Ash,42 the United States Supreme
Court identified four factors as relevant in determining whether an im-
plied cause of action should be created: 1) whether the plaintiff seeking
the remedy is a member of the class for whose "especial benefit" the
statute was enacted; 2) whether there is any indication of congressional
intent to create or deny such a remedy; 3) whether the remedy is con-
sistent with the statutory scheme; and 4) whether the remedy to be
implied is one traditionally relegated to state law, such that it would be
inappropriate to create the remedy solely on the basis of federal law. 43
Later decisions from the Supreme Court stress that the Cort test is merely
a guide in defining the legislative intent, so the central inquiry is still
whether the legislature intended to allow the remedy sought by the
37. A third area in which federal law has been developed, but not involv-
ing judicial supplementation of federal statutes, has been in cases where the
federal courts assert jurisdiction pursuant to a federal statute granting juris-
diction but not prescribing substantive law. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972) (creation of a federal common law of nuisance through federal
question jurisdiction grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976)).
Judge Friendly suggests that the new specialized federal common law has
developed in four areas: 1) through "spontaneous generation" in areas of
particular federal concern, such as in the interpretation of government con-
tracts and in the resolution of interstate disputes; 2) when federal courts are
asked to imply a private cause of action on behalf of an individual harmed by
violation of a federal statute; 3) where a jurisdictional grant by Congress man-
dates that the federal courts fashion substantive law; and 4) filling in the
interstices of federal statutes through the resolution of issues not provided for
in the relevant statutes. Friendly, supra note 36, at 421. Similarly, Professor
Hill has identified four "zones" where federal common law has been created:
1) in cases where a state is a party, particularly controversies between states;
2) admiralty cases; 3) cases involving the proprietary duties of the United
States; and 4) international law. Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal
Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1069 (1967).
See generally, Comment, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1512
(1969).
38. See notes 40-46 and accompanying text infra.
39. See note 46 and accompanying text infra.
40. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1977).
41. Id. at 25.
42. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). For discussion of the Cort test, see Crawford &
Schneider, The Implied Private Cause of Action and the Federal Aviation
Act: A Practical Application of Cort v. Ash, 23 VILL. L. REV. 657 (1978).
43. 422 U.S. at 78.
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plaintiff.44 Thus, the Cort test will not be applied once it can be shown
that Congress did not intend to allow any such remedy.4 5
Federal common law may also be created as a matter of statutory
construction when a court is called upon to resolve an issue not con-
templated by the drafters of an applicable statute; in such a case, the
court is said to be "filling in" the interstices of the statute.46 Since
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,47 it has been clear that over-
riding federal interests, the need for uniformity in the law, and invoca-
tion of the commerce clause in federal statutes have established a federal
preeminence in the field of labor law.4 8 As part of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Title VII was enacted pursuant to Congress' commerce power,
thereby strengthening the supremacy of federal law in this area.49
The primary objective of Title VII is to assure equality of employ-
ment opportunities by eliminating discrimination on the basis of race,
color, sex, religion, or national origin.50 Its comprehensive remedial
provisions, 51 applicable to employers 52 and unions 53 alike, suggest a
44. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 422 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
45. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979).
46. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)
(jurisdictional grant of the Labor-Management Relations Act mandates that
the federal courts create a body of federal common law labor law). The
Lincoln Mills Court wrote:
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some sub-
stantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in
certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbras of ex-
press statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction
but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and
fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of
judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem.
Id. at 457.
47. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See also note 46 supra.
48. 353 U.S. at 456-57. In the Lincoln Mills case, the Court found in the
federal jurisdictional provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act "a
mandate to federal judges to fashion a body of contract law consistent with the
policy of federal labor statutes and binding in all courts." Friendly, supra
note 36, at 412.
49. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(upholding the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
within the commerce power).
50. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 457 (1975);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Title VII authorizes injunctions
and other remedies, including, but not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, backpay awards payable by an employer or labor union, and any
other equitable relief which the court may deem appropriate. Id.
52. Title VII provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to hiring, firing
or compensation for services, or to classify employees on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive the employees of employment opportunities or would otherwise
adversely affect their status as employees. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
53. It is an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization to dis-
criminate against an individual or to classify its membership in any way which
9
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strong policy that unions and employers should be held jointly liable
to the extent that each is responsible for Title VII violations.5 4 Not-
withstanding the broad range of judicial remedies explicitly authorized
by Title VII,55 the statute also embodies a policy favoring extrajudicial
conciliation and settlement of employees' claims.56
The question of whether a violator of Title VII may obtain con-
tribution against a fellow wrongdoer was recently answered in the
affirmative by one federal court of appeals in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers.5 7 In Northwest Airlines, an employer sought a
declaratory judgment that two unions which had participated in the
negotiation of collective bargaining agreements discriminating against
female employees were liable in contribution for a recovery had by the
women against the employer for violations of Title VII 58 and the Equal
Pay Act.59
would deprive or tend to deprive its members of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect the employees, or to cause or attempt to cause
an employer to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(c).
54. See Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
55. See note 51 supra.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
57. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 969 (D.D.C. July 7, 1977), aff'd in
part and remanded in part, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100
S. Ct. 3008 (1980).
58. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 970. See notes 61-65 and accom-
panying text infra.
59. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 970. The discrimination involved
pay at lower rates for women than for men doing the same work. Id. See
also Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973) & 374
F. Supp. 1382 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 567 F.2d 429
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (class action by female
employees).
Applying the four part test of Cort v. Ash, the district court refused to
imply a cause of action for contribution in the Equal Pay Act since the em-
loyer was not a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted.
20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 971. For a discussion of Cort, see notes
42-45 and accompanying text supra. On appeal, the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the result reached by the district court, but on the grounds
that an implied cause of action was inconsistent with the statutory scheme of
the Equal Pay Act; the Court of Appeals viewed the "especial class" prong of
the test of Cort as satisfied, reasoning that employees would be the ultimate
beneficiaries of an implied cause of action for contribution on behalf of the
employer. 606 F.2d at 1354-55.
The district court also rejected the employer's claim that a right of con-
tribution should be gleaned from the interstices of the Equal Pay Act. 20
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 972. The district court reasoned that a right
of contribution would frustrate the policy of the Act. Id. at 971-72. Since
the purpose of the Act was to prevent a competitive edge from accruing to
an employer who cut costs by paying lower wages, such a competitive ad-
vantage would still be enjoyed by an employer to the extent that a union
shared in payment of the backpay liability. Id. Further, the district court
opined that, since the Equal Pay Act authorizes a suit by employees against
an employer but not a labor union, the requisite common liability to the
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While rejecting the Equal Pay Act claim,60 the district court held
that the employer was entitled to contribution under Title VII. 61 The
court criticized the reasoning behind the rule disallowing contribution,
maintaining that such a rule was basically unfair in visiting the entire
loss upon one defendant while another escaped all liability.62 The
district court opined that a right of contribution would provide an in-
creased deterrent against Title VII violations and prevent collusion
between a tort plaintiff and one of several defendants. 63 On appeal,
the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the employer's claim for
Title VII contribution for a determination of whether that claim was
barred by laches because the employer had not raised it in the original
class action suit brought by the employees. 4 The United States Supreme
Court has granted certiorari.6 5
Against this background, the Third Circuit heard the International's
appeal from the district court's grant of contribution in Glus.66 The
majority prefaced its analysis by acknowledging that Title VII makes
no express provision for contribution.6 7 The court noted, however, that
the emerging trend in the federal courts has been to allow contribution
in a wide range of cases, 68 and stated that fundamental fairness demands
that the liabilities of joint wrongdoers be shared.6 9
The majority interpreted the fact that Title VII is silent on the
existence of a right to contribution to mean only that contribution was
tort plaintiff was absent. Id. at 972. See note 20 and accompanying text
supra. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed that a right of contribution
was inconsistent with the language and purpose of the Equal Pay Act. 606
F.2d at 1353.
60. See note 59 supra.
61. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 972-76.
62. Id. at 975.
63. Id.
64. 606 F.2d at 1356. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) had filed an amicus curiae brief with the Court of Appeals in sup-
port of contribution under Title VII when the claim is made promptly by the
employer in the employees' original suit. Id. The EEOC has since reversed
its position. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at lb-2b app. Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Transport Workers, No. 79-1056 (filed Jan. 4, 1980).
65. 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980).
66. 629 F.2d at 250. See notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.
67. 629 F.2d at 252.
68. Id. at 257. The majority noted that the United States Supreme Court
has not heard a contribution case outside the admiralty context since Cooper
Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974), which the lower
courts have read quite broadly. 629 F.2d at 253. The majority rejected the
International's reliance on Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corp., 342 U.S. 282
(1952), reasoning instead that the more recent Cooper Stevedoring case was
indicative of a broad federal policy favoring contribution. 629 F.2d at 253.
For a discussion of Halcyon Lines and Cooper Stevedoring, see note 31 supra.
69. 629 F.2d at 252. The majority reasoned that contribution promoted
fundamental fairness by preventing one of several joint wrongdoers from
escaping liability for his actions solely because of the plaintiff's choice of
defendants. Id.
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not contemplated by Congress.7 ° Therefore, the majority reasoned, the
resolution of Murphy's claim for contribution involved an inquiry into
the interstices of Title VII.71 The majority opined that it may be neces-
sary to create federal common law in order to fill in the interstices of
,congressional acts in two types of cases: 1) through the establishment of
remedies or standards not provided for by the legislation but essential
to the realization of the legislative purpose; or 2) through the implica-
tion of a private cause of action on behalf of an individual harmed by
violation of a federal statute.7 2 The majority reasoned that, although
the instant case did not fit neatly into either of these two categories, the
analytical procedure followed in such cases provided the tools for its
resolution of Murphy's claim to contribution. 73 This procedure was
.said to involve an inquiry into the legislative purpose and intent under-
lying the statute to determine which rule urged upon the court by the
parties to the litigation was consistent with the congressional policy.74
The majority, unable to ascertain any indication of whether Congress
intended to allow a right of contribution in Title VII,75 reviewed the
policies implicit in Title VII and discussed the effect which the creation
-of a federal common law right of contribution might have upon those
policies.76
Considering the dominant policy of Title VII to be to stamp out
,discrimination against employees, the court concluded that a right of
contribution among Title VII violators would increase the likelihood
of each wrongdoer's payment of damages, thus increasing the deterrent
effect of Title VII and keeping both employers and labor unions vigilant
to avoid Title VII infractions.77 Secondly, the majority found that a
denial of contribution would frustrate the Title VII policy in favor of
joint liability of employers and unions to the extent that each was re-
sponsible for unlawful employment practices. 78 Finally, the majority
-determined that a right of contribution in Title VII would encourage
conciliation and settlement of employees' claims.7 9 The Third Circuit
,opined that the denial of contribution might discourage settlements since
violators would prefer to litigate employees' claims in the hope that
70. Id. at 253. The Third Circuit observed that the legislative history of
a statute that neither expressly authorizes nor denies a particular remedy
sought by a plaintiff will characteristically be equally silent or ambiguous on
,the question. Id. at 255. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
71. 629 F.2d at 253. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
72. 629 F.2d at 253-54.
73. Id. at 255.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 255-57. See notes 50-56 and accompanying text supra.
77. 629 F.2d at 256.
78. Id. at 255-56.
79. Id. at 256.
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judgments would also be rendered against any other violators.80 In
addition, the majority warned that, without contribution, employees
could be unjustly enriched through collusion with one of several de-
fendants or through extorting unjust settlements by threatening to sue
,only one defendant."'
The majority concluded that the policies and goals implicit in Title
VII would be more fully realized by a right of contribution among
violators of the statute.8 2 Although no indication could be found as to
whether Congress intended to allow such a remedy, the Third Circuit
reasoned that Congress would have approved any remedy for allocation
of liability among Title VII wrongdoers which would advance the legis-
lative purposes inherent in the statute. 8
In dissent, Judge Sloviter objected to the majority's creation of a
right to contribution in Title VII, a statute which she characterized as
not expressly providing for contribution, as not implicitly authorizing
contribution, and as not necessarily requiring contribution to effectuate
its purposes.8 4 Although the dissent acknowledged in principle the
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 257.
83. See id. at 255. The majority also affirmed the district court's calcula-
tion of the International's liability. Id. at 257-58. See note 14 supra. Fur-
ther, the Third Circuit held that the employees' failure to name the Interna-
tional as a defendant in the employees' original claim before the Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC) did not deprive the district
court of jurisdiction when the employees sought judicial resolution of their
claim. 629 F.2d at 252. Jurisdiction over the International was affirmed on
the basis of four factors enumerated in the court's earlier opinion on this
issue:
1) whether the role of the unnamed party.could through reasonable
effort by the complainant be ascertained at the time of the filing of
the EEOC complaint; 2) whether, under the circumstances, the inter-
ests of a named [party] are so similar as [sic] the unnamed party's
that for the purpose of obtaining voluntary conciliation and compli-
ance it would be unnecessary to include the unnamed party in the
EEOC proceedings; 3) whether its absence from the EEOC proceed-
ings resulted in actual prejudice to the interests of the unnamed
party; 4) whether the unnamed party has in some way represented to
the complainant that its relationship with the complainant is to be
through the named party.
Id. at 251, quoting Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1977).
The majority further held that Murphy was not entitled to recover interest
paid to the employees on deferred installments of the settlement payments,
since Murphy had enjoyed the present use of those funds; that it was not an
abuse of the district court's discretion to deny recovery to Murphy of pre-judgment interest against the International; and that the International had
waived any objections to the amount of Murphy's settlement with the em-
ployees. 629 F.2d at 258-59.
Significantly, since Murphy had failed to raise the issue in its pleadings,
the majority refused to decide whether federal question jurisdiction might
exist over Murphy's claim for contribution. Id. at 252 n.l. See note 37
supra.
84. 629 F.2d at 259 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
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existence of a federal common law and the pressing need for a uniform
federal rule allowing or prohibiting contribution,8 5 Judge Sloviter
argued that the majority had improperly treated Murphy's claim for
contribution as an invitation to fashion federal common law rather than
an occasion for filling in the statutory interstices of Title VII.86
To Judge Sloviter, the judicial tasks of creating common law and
filling statutory interstices involve wholly different procedures. She
urged that the distinction between these two judicial functions is in the
nature of the statute involved: if the statute involves a bare jurisdictional
grant, the courts are free to fashion common law; however, if the
statute prescribes a substantive rule of law, the courts are limited to
filling any interstices therein.87 Since Title VII provides substantive
law, in Judge Sloviter's view, federal common law could not be created.
Consequently, any rights to contribution could only lie in the interstices
of the statute.8 8 Since the statute provides for enforcement procedures
and has operated effectively without contribution in the past, Judge
Sloviter would hold that the statutory scheme embodied in Title VII
precludes the judicial supplementation of the statute through creation
of additional remedies such as contribution.8 9 Moreover, according to
the dissent, Congress would have expressly authorized contribution if it
had intended to make the remedy available. 90
Finally, Judge Sloviter questioned the majority's conclusions that
contribution would provide a strong deterrent against Title VII infrac-
tions and promote settlement of employees' claims.9 1 In her view, the
possibility of sole liability without contribution would prove a stronger
deterrent. 92 Furthermore, Judge Sloviter reasoned that the prospect of
liability in contribution would discourage settlements. 93 At best, the
dissent concluded, the arguments favoring and opposing rights of con-
tribution among Title VII violators were inconclusive, calling for close
85. Id.
86. Id. at 259-60 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 264-65 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that courts
exercising common law jurisdiction enjoy a wide discretion to adopt the rule
of law which seems fairest and most appropriate under the circumstances,
while courts filling in the interstices of federal statutes have their discretion
narrowed by their duty to construe the statute in accordance with the legisla-
tive intent. Id. at 263-64 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 263-65 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 265 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 265-66 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Judge Sloviter reasoned that
Congress was aware of the general policy against judicially created rights of
contribution and, if it had intended to create such a right, it would have done
so expressly. Id. at 265 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 268 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). See notes 77 8c 79-80 and accom-
panying text supra.
92. 629 F.2d at 268 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
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policy determinations more appropriately made by Congress than by
the courtsY4
In reviewing the Glus opinion, it is submitted that, although the
federal common law may properly be invoked to declare a right of con-
tribution among Title VII violators,9 5 the Third Circuit majority may
have overestimated the deterrent effect of contribution and the con-
comitant furtherance of the Title VII policy favoring settlement of
employees' claims. 96 Consequently, it is suggested that the majority's
foundation of Title VII policy represents an unsound rationale for the
creation of a federal common law right of contribution. While it ap-
pears that the strong national interest in a uniform national labor law 97
would support the creation of a federal common law right of contribu-
tion, and that the Glus majority properly considered the policies under.
lying Title VII as controlling upon the court's decision, 98 it is suggested
that a right of contribution in Title VII will neither significantly pro-
mote the attractiveness of settlement of employees' claims nor provide
an increased deterrent against Title VII violations. 9
It is important to note that the Glus litigation involved a claim for
contribution arising from the full settlement of the employees' claim.100
Where there is no such full settlement involved, a rule allowing con-
tribution may actually discourage settlement since a defendant may re-
frain from settling out of fear that he may be held liable for contribution
to co-defendants who choose to litigate the employees' claim.' 0 ' Un-
less, as in the full settlement context of Glus, the settling defendant can
be assured that he will not be held liable to other defendants who
proceed to trial, settlement would lose its attractiveness since no de-
fendant could thereby achieve a final and complete termination of his
involvement with a case. 102
Further, a right of contribution in Title VII may not provide an
increased deterrent against Title VII violations. Manifestly, contribu-
tion alters the liabilities of joint wrongdoers in two respects. While the
possibility that all of the defendants will share in the payment of the
plaintiff's judgment is increased since the fortunate wrongdoer who
somehow escapes the plaintiff's lawsuit is less likely to also evade the
retributive demands of his less fortunate cohorts, the magnitude of the
94. Id.
95. See notes 72-76 and accompanying text supra.
96. See notes 77 & 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
97. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 74-83 and accompanying text supra.
99. See notes 50-56, 77 & 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
100. 629 F.2d at 257.
101. See W. PROSSER, supra note 20, at 309-10. The Glus majority recog-
nized this problem, but stated that this disincentive to settlement was not
serious enough to require a denial of contribution. See 629 F.2d at 256 n.2.
102. See 629 F.2d at 268 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
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potential liability of any single wrongdoer is decreased since no single
defendant will be held liable for the entire amount of damages awarded
to the plaintiff. When the effects of contribution are viewed in this.
light, it appears that the Third Circuit's conclusion that a right of con-
tribution would provide an increased deterrent against Title VII viola-
tions is implicitly founded on the arguable assumption that an increased
probability of a relatively smaller liability will be a greater deterrent
than the relatively smaller possibility of a larger liability.103
In their reluctance to treat negligent wrongdoers too harshly, it is
submitted that the courts have overlooked the narrow rule of Merry-
weather which denied contribution to the wilful and conscious wrong-
doer.1°4 Glus is representative of the emerging federal common law 105
as well as the growing trend in statutes and court decisions in favor of
contribution notwithstanding the nature of the wrongdoing involved.1'6
While a right of contribution may further certain policy goals under-
lying Title VII in fact situations akin to those of Glus 107 those same
policies may not be advanced 108 or may actually be frustrated 109 if
Glus is read too broadly.
David C. Corujo
103. See id. Judge Sloviter reasoned that:
[A] rule against contribution might very well encourage deterrence be-
cause potential violators would be more likely to refrain from viola-
tions if they knew that any injured party could impose the full
burden of recovery on any one of them even though it played only
a relatively minor role in the activity.
Id.
104. See notes 24-31 and accompanying text supra.
105. See notes 32-39 and accompanying text supra.
106. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
107. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
108. See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
109. See notes 101-02 and accompanying text supra.
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